Update on Thefaut v Johnson, para 1.26, page 18

In Spencer v Hillingdon Hospital NHS Trust[1] it was determined that the Montgomery approach to informed consent was simply a variant of Bolam and that the test was: would the ‘ordinary sensible patient’ feel justifiably aggrieved at not being provided with the information in issue. In Thefaut v Johnson[2] Green J (correctly in the authors’ view) rejected that approach, indicating that it failed to give sufficient weight to the subjective – and patient-centric – approach required by the Supreme Court in Montgomery.[3] 

Update to para 5.12, page 132: Introduction to the Official Solicitor
para 5.26, page 147: Litigation Friend
para 5.58, page 170: The High Court’s inherent jurisdiction in relation to vulnerable adults
Appendix 5.7 

The Official Solicitor has issued a new and amplified Practice Direction - Appointment In Family Proceedings And Proceedings Under The Inherent Jurisdiction In Relation To Adults, January 2017: http://bit.ly/2lYHJ8O.
This replaces the Practice Direction issued in March 2013, set out at Appendix 5.7.

Update to para 6.1, page 174: General

R (ota Ferreira) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner South London [2017] EWCA Civ 31 addresses the tangled issue of what actually constitutes a deprivation of liberty. It is a further retreat by the judiciary from the far-reaching implications of Cheshire West.

Update to main text para 1.25 fn3, page 18: 

For guidance on consent see the Royal College of Surgeons’ Consent: Supported Decision-Making - a good practice guide: http://bit.ly/2jZ6qCo which notes:

‘The surgeon discussing treatment with the patient should be suitably trained and qualified to provide the treatment in question and have sufficient knowledge of the associated risks and complications, as well as any alternative treatments available for the patient’s condition’

Update to main text para 13.10, page 397

There has been some debate[1] as to the position where the provision of clinically assisted artificial nutrition and hydration is clearly covered by a valid and applicable advance decision to refuse treatment or has been properly delegated by a Lasting Power of Attorney[2].  

Update to main text para 13.13¸ page 406

In his Oxford speech,[1] Baker J contrasted diagnosis of brainstem activity, which can be done with neurological testing, with the extreme difficulty of diagnosing a patient’s level of consciousness, commenting:

‘The principal potential weakness is that there are no definitive criteria of awareness so that such assessments depend on judgment and interpretation which may be challenging even for the professionals experienced in carrying out the assessments. Furthermore, differences may arise between the observations professionals carrying out assessments and those of family members who, while they may lack the objectivity which the professional possesses, have spent far more time with the patient and have greater experience of interpreting their behaviour.'